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find that emotion perception is rather an umbrella term for various perception paradigms, each with
distinct neural structures that underline task-related cognitive demands. Furthermore, the left amygdala
was responsive across all classes of decisional paradigms, regardless of task-related demands. Based on
these observations, we propose a neurocognitive model that outlines the information flow in the brain
needed for a successful evaluation of and decisions on other individuals’ emotions. HIGHLIGHTS: Emo-
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Humans make various kinds of decisions about which emotions they perceive from
others. Although it might seem like a split-second phenomenon, deliberating over
which emotions we perceive unfolds across several stages of decisional processing.
Neurocognitive models of general perception postulate that our brain first extracts
sensory information about the world then integrates these data into a percept and
lastly interprets it. The aim of the present study was to build an evidence-based
neurocognitive model of perceptual decision-making on others' emotions. We con-
ducted a series of meta-analyses of neuroimaging data spanning 30 years on the
explicit evaluations of others' emotional expressions. We find that emotion percep-
tion is rather an umbrella term for various perception paradigms, each with distinct
neural structures that underline task-related cognitive demands. Furthermore, the
left amygdala was responsive across all classes of decisional paradigms, regardless of
task-related demands. Based on these observations, we propose a neurocognitive
model that outlines the information flow in the brain needed for a successful evalua-
tion of and decisions on other individuals' emotions.
Highlights
• Emotion classification involves heterogeneous perception and decision-making
tasks
• Decision-making processes on emotions rarely covered by existing emotions
theories
• We propose an evidence-based neuro-cognitive model of decision-making on
emotions
• Bilateral brain processes for nonverbal decisions, left brain processes for verbal
decisions
• Left amygdala involved in any kind of decision on emotions
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The process of perceiving and identifying emotions signaled by others
is often a split-second instance of emotion perception. However, this
apparently rapid action is actually the outcome of multiple stages of
decision-making based on various levels of neural and cognitive
processing. This decisional process might differ according to the spe-
cific requirements of certain contexts and situations. Some contexts,
for example, require the perceiver to label the emotions they recog-
nize in another to communicate them to others involved, thereby
transposing a sensory percept into a verbal category (i.e., verbal label-
ing). Other contexts might require more basic types of recognition
below the level of verbalizations, such as matching the emotions of
two individuals (i.e., emotional matching) or deciding that one person
shows an emotion different from others or from previous encounters
(i.e., emotional discrimination). Finally, other contexts might only
require rating the intensity of emotions regardless of the emotion per-
ceived (i.e., emotional intensity rating). These different types of deci-
sions on perceived emotions are assumed to imply different
neurocognitive mechanisms (Figure 1).
During these various situational types of decision-making on per-
ceived emotions, the human neurocognitive system needs to extract
sensory information from different sensory channels, such as facial and
vocal expressions and body postures, integrate this data into a gestalt
percept, and then interpret it (Belin, Fecteau, & Bedard, 2004; Bern-
stein & Yovel, 2015; de Gelder, De Borst, & Watson, 2015). The full
process of extraction, integration, and interpretation of sensory infor-
mation enables individuals to perform perceptual decisions about the
most likely emotion expressed by other individuals (i.e., categorization
of facial, vocal, or bodily features as expressing an emotional state,
e.g., joy). This process of deliberation in which sensory information is
used to decode and evaluate the external world is called perceptual
decision-making (Hauser & Salinas, 2014; Heekeren, Marrett,
Bandettini, & Ungerleider, 2004; Mulder, van Maanen, & Forstmann,
2014; Schall, 2001). In contrast to other forms of decision-making, per-
ceptual choices emphasize the role of sensory information in reaching a
decision and in directing reactive behavior (Summerfield & De Lange,
2014; Wiech et al., 2014).
There are currently no formal detailed neurobiological,
neurocognitive, or psychological models of how humans perceive
F IGURE 1 (a) Paradigms of perceptual decision-making on others' emotional expressions. On-screen labeling (top left) consists of matching
the perceived emotional expression to a verbal label that is simultaneously displayed on-screen. In off-screen emotion labeling (top middle),
participants are asked to keep a mental trace of the possible verbal labels throughout the experiment and match the perceived expression to the
correct label. The emotion matching task (top right) consists of a triad of facial expressions, in which participants must match the expression of
the target face to the expression of one of two simultaneously presented faces. Emotion rating asks participants to rate the level of arousal
(bottom left) or valence (bottom middle) of the emotional expression. The bottom right corner depicts a variant of emotion discrimination (“same
or different” task), in which participants must determine whether two target stimuli portray identical or different emotional expressions. For ease
of illustration, all stimuli depicted here consist of facial expressions of emotions. However, except for emotion matching, which consists
exclusively of facial expressions, the stimuli included in our meta-analyses consisted of facial expressions, vocal prosody, and body postures.
(b) Summary of the findings on perceptual decision-making on emotions, with a special focus on the unique regions revealed by the contrast
analyses. (c) A neurocognitive model of decision-making on emotions based on general principles of perceptual processing connecting sensory
regions (visual, auditory), association areas (lexicon, dynamic), and limbic areas (emotion) with higher-cognitive areas in the frontal cortex (mental
state, verbal, nonverbal). Amy, amygdala; dMFC, dorsomedial frontal cortex; dTri, dorsal pars triangularis; FG, fusiform gyrus; IFJ, inferior frontal
junction; IPS, intraparietal sulcus; mTri, mid pars triangularis; Oper, pars opercularis; Orb, pars orbitalis; pMTG, posterior middle temporal gyrus;
Vis, visual cortex; vTri, ventral pars triangularis
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emotions in individuals. The present work aims to fill this gap of knowl-
edge. Much has been said by biological, neurocognitive, and psychologi-
cal theories concerning emotion elicitation and emotion expression, but
few of these theories directly address the process of perceiving emo-
tions in other individuals (e.g., Coppin & Sander, 2013; Faucher, 2013;
Nesse, 2014). For example, affect program theories postulate that indi-
viduals from different cultures and even species are born with the same
capabilities of expressing emotions through sets of motor responses,
such as facial and vocal expressions and body postures (Ekman et al.,
1987). In return, this makes emotion perception and inference possible
with a high level of certainty without the use of any other information
(Ekman, 1992; Ekman et al., 1987; Panksepp, 2000; Scherer, Clark-Pol-
ner, & Mortillaro, 2011). Strong appraisal theories, on the other hand,
postulate that we are capable of inferring the emotions of others by
reverse-engineering the individual appraisal patterns associated with
each perceived emotional expression (Scherer & Ellgring, 2007; Scherer,
Mortillaro, & Mehu, 2013). For example, upon encountering someone's
facial expression of wide eyes and open mouth (i.e., common expres-
sions for both surprise-inducing and fear-inducing stimuli; Scherer &
Ellgring, 2007), we can deduce that the individual appraises the stimulus
as novel and unexpected but not as threatening because no fear-related
expressions follow, such as backing up and moving away. Nevertheless,
the exact mechanism of inferring the emotional experiences in others
remains vaguely formulated in both appraisal theories and affect pro-
gram theories (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011; Scherer, Banse, & Wallbott,
2001; Scherer & Ellgring, 2007), though it has been proposed that the
act of emotion inference is separate from the act of perception
(Scherer & Ellgring, 2007; Scherer et al., 2013).
Perhaps the one account that has come closest to providing a
mechanistic account of emotion perception consists of constructivism
theories, which argue that others' emotions can be accurately inferred
from a combination of motor expression perception, context processing
and conceptual knowledge about the relationships between emotions,
desires, and beliefs (Barrett, 2006; Barrett & Kensinger, 2010; Russell,
2005, 2009). The perception of motor expressions can inform the emo-
tion inference process not because motor expressions reflect emotions
per se (i.e., there is no one-on-one mapping) but because the perceiver
has learned through experience to associate certain motor expressions
with certain emotional experiences via a bootstrapping process (Barrett,
Mesquita, & Gendron, 2011; Lindquist, 2013) or even a process of elim-
ination (DiGirolamo & Russell, 2017; Nelson & Russell, 2016). For
example, individuals may have come to learn that frown eyebrows and
pouted lips are often associated with a limited set of mental states
(e.g., anger and sudden euphoric joy). Here, the perception of context is
crucial in determining which of the possible mental states from the set
is the most likely felt emotion (Barrett & Kensinger, 2010; Barrett et al.,
2011; Sommer, Dohnel, Meinhardt, & Hajak, 2008). Finally, constructiv-
ism theories argue that conceptual knowledge in the form of folk theo-
ries about emotions and mental states can help refine the inference
process (Barrett, 2006; Lindquist, 2013; Ochsner et al., 2009; Zaki,
2013) and that language processes play a crucial role in the categorical
perception of emotional expressions (Barrett, Lindquist, & Gendron,
2007; Lindquist, Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, & Russell, 2006; Lindquist &
Gendron, 2013). However, this evidence is not uncontroversial
(Deonna & Scherer, 2010; Panksepp, 2007; Sauter, 2018; Sauter,
LeGuen, & Haun, 2011).
In summary, the majority of psychological and neurocognitive
theories only go as far as describing how an individual experiences
and manifests an emotion, which represents only the input for the
perceptual decision-making process on others' emotions (Scherer
et al., 2013). One possible reason for this discrepancy in theory cov-
erage is the overwhelming evidence that the emotional expressions
of others are perceived in a categorical manner (Fugate, 2013;
Jaywant & Pell, 2012), which is compatible with multiple theories of
emotion (e.g., Scherer et al., 2011), hence providing little incentive
for further scrutiny. The term categorical perception describes the
subjective experience in which a perceived dimension jumps
abruptly from one category to another at a certain point along a
continuum, instead of changing gradually (Liberman, Harris, Hoff-
man, & Griffith, 1957). For example, faces or voices in a morphing
sequence between two prototypical emotions are perceived as
either one or the other but not as something in between (Cheal &
Rutherford, 2015; Etcoff & Magee, 1992; Fujimura, Matsuda,
Katahira, Okada, & Okanoya, 2012; Jaywant & Pell, 2012;
Korolkova, 2014; Laukka, 2005). The robust phenomenon of cate-
gorical perception of emotions has been replicated with various
response formats and analysis methods (Bimler & Kirkland, 2001;
Campanella, Quinet, Bruyer, Crommelinck, & Guerit, 2002; Cheal &
Rutherford, 2010, 2015; Dailey, Cottrell, Padgett, & Adolphs, 2002;
Fujimura et al., 2012; Kotsoni, de Haan, & Johnson, 2001; Sauter
et al., 2011). Categorical and continuous perception often co-occur
when processing the emotions of others: the former allows for a
gestalt perception of a single emotion, while the latter enables to us
to perceive subtle variances within an emotional construct
(Fujimura et al., 2012). However, categorical perception appears to
dominate the way we process and attribute emotions in others
(Fugate, 2013) and the reason for this could be to achieve cognitive
efficiency by parsing out information into meaningful, but limited,
pieces of information (Goldstone & Hendrickson, 2010; Harnad,
1987; Schusterman, Reichmuth, & Kastak, 2000). Indeed, Etcoff and
Magee (1992) argued that, if the perceiver were to quickly detect
the sender's mental state, a blend of emotions would be difficult to
interpret meaningfully. Instead, relying on the dominant emotion in
the signal would be more likely to give an accurate prediction about
the sender's mental state and, by proxy, about the environment.
The highly debated question in the emotion perception field is
not whether emotions are perceived categorically, but rather to what
extent is the phenomenon of categorical perception more perceptual
or more conceptual (Fugate, 2013). In other words, do we subjectively
perceive others' emotional expressions as discrete entities because
emotions per se are discrete categories or is it because we construc-
tively create the perceived emotion so effortlessly out of multiple
sources of information (e.g., context, knowledge about the target) that
our brains are “tricked” into seeing distinct categories, akin optical illu-
sions? As with many psychological phenomena, a middle ground has
been proposed: there is a seesaw relationship between the innate
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tendency for categorical perception and the context in which the
emotional expression occurs (Fugate, 2013; Hess & Hareli, 2017). As
the emotional signal increases in noise and becomes ambiguous
(e.g., tendency of the perceived agent to mask the emotion), so does
the influence of context and language increases in deducing the emo-
tional state. Conversely, the richer the emotional expression is in situ-
ational information (e.g., a boisterous laugh), the lower the need to
rely on context to infer the respective emotional state (Hareli,
Elkabetz, & Hess, 2019).
Lesion and neuroimaging studies are principally equipped with
informing models of perceptual decision-making because they aim to
reveal underlying brain structures and disclose associated mental pro-
cesses, an impossible feat for behavioral or physiological experiments
(Aue, Lavelle, & Cacioppo, 2009). However, as with biological and psy-
chological models of emotions, current neurocognitive models suffer
from a similarly unbalanced focus on the input of perceptual decision-
making on emotions, namely the type of sensory information that is
extracted by the visual and auditory cortices (Belin et al., 2004;
Concina, Renna, Grosso, & Sacchetti, 2019; Frühholz, Trost, & Kotz,
2016; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000; Rauschecker, 2017; Sedda &
Scarpina, 2012) and how this information is integrated into a percept
(Bernstein & Yovel, 2015; Brück, Kreifelts, & Wildgruber, 2011;
Heekeren, Marrett, & Ungerleider, 2008; Schirmer & Adolphs, 2017;
Schirmer & Kotz, 2006). So far, less focus has been placed on how
higher cognitive functions (e.g., language processes, accessing seman-
tic knowledge) contribute to the formation of a holistic percept and
its interpretation within various contexts.
Perceptual decision-making on emotions is naturally part of a gen-
eral perception system, for which neurocognitive models do exist. How-
ever, simple extrapolation from these models to the realm of emotional
expressions is not warranted, as the latter constitute a special class of
signals while the former were built from generic stimuli (Sander,
Grafman, & Zalla, 2003; Scherer, 2009; Van Kleef, 2010). Unlike per-
ceiving colors and pure tones, for instance, evaluating emotional stimuli
engages a broader range of cognitive processes and potentially higher
degrees of perceptual and inferential freedom. Nevertheless, we expect
that perceptual decision-making on emotional expressions adheres to
the same three principles of general perception. First, sensory informa-
tion is extracted by visual and auditory primary and associative regions
(Hauser & Salinas, 2014). Within these regions, there are further areas
specialized in processing human faces (Bernstein & Yovel, 2015; Haxby
et al., 2000), body postures (de Gelder et al., 2015; Peelen & Downing,
2005), and human voices (Belin et al., 2004; Ceravolo, Fruhholz, &
Grandjean, 2016; Frühholz & Belin, 2018; Pernet et al., 2015). Second,
this sensory information is passed along two anatomically segregated
and functionally specialized processing streams, dubbed the ventral
stream and the dorsal stream (Goodale & Milner, 1992; Goodale &
Westwood, 2004; O'Reilly, 2010; Rauschecker, 2012, 2013). The ven-
tral pathway, connecting primary sensory cortices with temporal and
prefrontal regions, is functionally conceptualized as the “what” stream,
responsible for stimulus recognition and identification, and the mapping
of sensory information onto conceptual representations (Goodale &
Milner, 1992; Grill-Spector & Weiner, 2014; Hebart & Hesselmann,
2012; Kravitz, Saleem, Baker, Ungerleider, & Mishkin, 2013). The dorsal
pathway, connecting primary sensory areas with parietal and prefrontal
regions, constitutes the “where/how” stream, responsible for
processing space and motion, including locating objects in space, under-
standing others' movements and guiding our own actions toward
objects in space (Arbib, 2017; Friederici, 2012; Goodale, Westwood, &
Milner, 2004; Lega, Stephan, Zatorre, & Penhune, 2016; Murakami, Kell,
Restle, Ugawa, & Ziemann, 2015). Finally, perception occurs when the
incoming sensory information is made available to higher-order brain
regions and matched against a mental template. In the ventral stream,
this mental template consists of semantic categorical representations
(a prototype of a stimulus, e.g., how a face generally looks like)
(Sedda & Scarpina, 2012; Summerfield & Koechlin, 2008; Summerfield
et al., 2006; Takahashi, Ohki, & Kim, 2013). In the dorsal stream, the
mental template consists of visuomotor and audiomotor sequences
potentially stored in our procedural memory (e.g., how emotional
expressions and emotional utterances evolve over time) (Goodale,
Króliczak, & Westwood, 2005; Goodale & Milner, 1992; Rauschecker,
2011, 2012). Such templates allow us to perceive and discriminate
other individuals' actions, including facial movements (Bernstein &
Yovel, 2015) and speech (Rauschecker, 2012).
A later stage in the emotional perception process concerns emo-
tional categorization or verbal labeling. By converting the set of sensory
information into a percept that can be communicated, an individual is
able to relate and describe the emotional status of another individual.
Regarding this stage, a significant task-dependent role is assigned to
the frontal cortex in matching incoming sensory information to a mental
template (Brück et al., 2011; Dricu & Frühholz, 2016; Frühholz &
Grandjean, 2013b; Liakakis, Nickel, & Seitz, 2011; Sakagami & Pan,
2007; Schirmer & Kotz, 2006). While reviews and meta-analyses exist
on the multiple roles of the inferior frontal cortex (IFC) in perceiving a
large class of stimuli (Dal Monte et al., 2014; Greenlee et al., 2007;
Liakakis et al., 2011; Rahnev, Nee, Riddle, Larson, & D'Esposito, 2016),
no such systematic reviews exist for perceiving emotional expressions,
despite abundant empirical data (Dricu & Frühholz, 2016). Another con-
sistent frontal brain structure recruited during the perceptual decisions
on emotions is the dorsomedial frontal cortex (dmFC). This structure is
predominantly involved in social cognition, such as forming impressions
about others and inferring beliefs, desires, and intentions (Fruhholz,
Trost, & Grandjean, 2016; Korb, Fruhholz, & Grandjean, 2015;
J. P. Mitchell, Cloutier, Banaji, & Macrae, 2006; Schlaffke et al., 2015;
Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014; Venkatraman, Rosati,
Taren, & Huettel, 2009). The emotional expressions conveyed by others
are inherently social stimuli and are processed differently from other
classes of stimuli such as inanimate objects (Amodio & Frith, 2006). The
involvement of the dmFC in this particular decisional process suggests
that facial, bodily and vocal emotional expressions are not only proxies
for mental states but also that perceivers spontaneously infer traits and
mental states (i.e., beliefs, desire, intention) (Reisenzein, 2009), which
are integrated in the emotional evaluation (Dricu & Frühholz, 2016;
Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996; Van Overwalle, 2009, 2011).
In addition to the frontal brain structures targeted by the ventral
and dorsal processing stream, other brain structures that do not
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exclusively belong to either processing stream also contribute to per-
ceptual decisions on emotions. One such structure is the amygdala,
which works concomitantly with sensory cortices and higher-order cor-
tices to tag incoming sensory information with contextual relevance
(Pannese, Grandjean, & Fruhholz, 2016; Phelps & LeDoux, 2005) and
subsequently detect this relevance upon the next encounter with that
stimulus or circumstance (Sander et al., 2003). For example, the proce-
dure of fear conditioning instills an initially neutral stimulus with the
capacity of inducing reactions and behaviors that are biologically rele-
vant (e.g., freezing or fleeing) upon consistent association with an aver-
sive unconditioned stimulus (Pape & Pare, 2010). Furthermore, the
amygdala is likely to process diverse emotional expressions, such as
facial expressions (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2002; O'Toole, Roark, &
Abdi, 2002; Rossion, 2015; Sabatinelli et al., 2011) and vocal prosody
features (Fruhholz, Klaas, Patel, & Grandjean, 2015; Frühholz et al.,
2015, 2016; Pannese, Grandjean, & Frühholz, 2015, Pannese et al.,
2016) as relevant social signals (Sander et al., 2003). The large variety
of cortical and subcortical projections to and from the amygdala provide
it with information about the properties of the stimulus as well as the
ongoing goals and needs of the organism (J. L. Price, 2003). As such, the
amygdala might serve as one of the interfaces between sensory cortices
and higher-order brain structures.
Altogether, perceptual decision-making on emotions likely involves
a large neural network of brain regions with complementary functional
roles. The present meta-analysis endeavored to systematically review
and meta-analytically analyze the neuroimaging literature to uncover
our knowledge of this large neural network to date. Additionally, we
also aimed to account for several shortcomings in the field of emotion
perception. The first shortcoming concerns a lack of acknowledgment
of the heterogeneity of perceptual tasks on emotional expressions. The
second is the lack of interest on the differential involvement of distrib-
uted brain systems depending on the decisional requirements. There
has been an implicit assumption that perception tasks do not differ
qualitatively from one another (Elliott, Zahn, Deakin, & Anderson, 2011;
Ong, Zaki, & Goodman, 2015; Schlegel, Boone, & Hall, 2017). Reviews
and meta-analyses frequently aggregate heterogeneous tasks of emo-
tion perception, discarding any differences in task instructions (Fusar-
Poli, Placentino, Carletti, Landi, & Abbamonte, 2009; Müller, Höhner, &
Eickhoff, 2018; Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002; Wager, Phan,
Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003). Alternatively, some researchers use a specific
paradigm of emotion perception and then extrapolate their findings
across the entire phenomenon of emotion perception (e.g., (Adolphs,
Damasio, Tranel, Cooper, & Damasio, 2000).
Notably, in a recent meta-analysis, Müller et al. (2018) examined
the influence of task requirements (i.e., explicit evaluation of facial emo-
tional expression vs. focus on a nonemotional face feature) on the
recruitment of brain regions during human imaging studies. However,
their focus was solely on the visual face-processing network and they
did not differentiate between different types of explicit evaluation and
decision tasks. To fill in these gaps, we review both the visual and audi-
tory domain of others' emotional expression as part of the decisional
process on emotions. Furthermore, we specifically argue that the differ-
ential requirements of various explicit emotion perception tasks
including decisions on perceived emotions should be assessed. While
neurobiologists and neuroscientists have long used sophisticated batte-
ries of tests that tap into various facets of emotion perception in stud-
ies, for both healthy participants and patient samples (Boller &
Grafman, 2000; Wilhelm, Hildebrandt, Manske, Schacht, & Sommer,
2014), there still seems a certain lack of acknowledgment concerning
the heterogeneity of perceptual and decisional tasks on emotional
expressions and their differential neural implications. We thus reviewed
the neuroimaging literature of emotion perception spanning 30 years.
Using the existing literature to inform us about the neurocognitive
mechanisms behind perceptual decisions on others' emotions, we then
built an evidence-based neurocognitive model of emotion perception
(Figure 1). Finally, we connected our neurocognitive model of emotion
perception with biological, neuroscientific, and psychological theories of
emotion and neurocognitive models of general perception.
2 | MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1 | Selection of neuroimaging studies
Potentially eligible studies for perceptual decision-making of emotions
were identified by conducting a search on PubMed for studies publi-
shed online between January 1st 1989 and July 1st 2019, using the fol-
lowing keyword combinations: (fmri OR pet) AND (emotion* OR
affective) AND (face* OR facial OR body OR posture* OR voice* OR
vocal). Study inclusion was restricted to whole-brain functional mag-
netic resonance imaging studies or PET studies written in English on
perceptual decision-making on emotions across a variety of tasks. A
series of five inclusion and exclusion criteria were further applied at the
level of participants, stimuli, task instructions, imaging data, and imaging
contrasts reported. All potential studies were independently screened
by each author, and were selected if they had sufficient experimental
and data quality. A flow chart of the study search, inclusion and exclu-
sion criteria, and the final selection of studies is shown in Figure 2.
2.2 | Participants selection
Only healthy adults with a median or average age between 18 and
59 years old were included in the analyses. Studies with less than
eight participants were excluded, as they would mostly introduce
noise in the data (Eickhoff et al., 2009). Clinical and pharmaceutical
studies were included if they reported separate, within-group analyses
for the controls or the placebo condition. Studies on imaging genetics
were included if they randomly selected the sample out of the general
population and allowed the allele quotas to fall out naturally.
2.3 | Experimental stimuli
The included studies used emotional expressions conveyed in the
face, voice, or body postures according to either a basic emotions
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model (i.e., anger, fear, joy, sadness, disgust, surprise) or a valence-
arousal model (e.g., mildly/highly pleasant/unpleasant). Emotional
expressions were either prototypical or morphed/filtered; unimodal
(e.g., faces only, voices only) or multimodal (e.g., faces and voices
together); presented either in a static or dynamic form. Furthermore,
the emotional stimuli must have been previously validated as per-
taining to an emotional construct (e.g., Ekman faces) or must have
been validated in a pilot study specific for the paradigm in question.
For the sake of uniformity, one study using point-light stimuli to
depict emotional faces and body expressions was not included
(Atkinson, Vuong, & Smithson, 2012). Mental states (e.g., Mind in the
eye task) and sexual or erotic stimuli were also excluded.
2.4 | Task instructions
Because we were interested in the perceptual decision-making on
emotional expressions, we only included studies that used a paradigm
of active deliberation over perceived emotional expressions
(e.g., identify, categorize, and discriminate). We specifically excluded
studies that prompted the participants to feel the emotion perceived
or to react to it, as well as studies looking into learning (e.g., fear con-
ditioning), memory for emotional stimuli (e.g., recall of happy
vs. neutral faces) or the effects of emotion on cognition. Similarly,
studies that required emotional expressions to be imagined, antici-
pated, or generated were excluded. Studies on backward masking of
emotions (i.e., an emotional face presented at a near-threshold detec-
tion rate, e.g., 67 ms) and binocular rivalry (e.g., emotional faces sup-
erimposed on houses) were included only if the participants were fully
aware of the stimuli.
2.5 | Imaging data
The brain activation data must have been reported in either the stan-
dard MNI or Talairach space. Studies failing to report the imaging
space were not included. Furthermore, only studies on changes in
regional activation (i.e., as revealed by task comparison or by image
subtraction method) were included. Because the activation likelihood
estimation (ALE) meta-analysis has been validated with contrast-based
analyses, we excluded data on changes in functional or effective con-
nectivity, and data reporting an interaction between stimulus and
time, or task and time. Similarly, we excluded studies reporting
contrast-based deactivation, as it is conceptually recommended that
activation and deactivation studies are investigated separately (Müller
et al., 2018).
2.6 | Imaging contrasts
We were particularly interested in an “emotion versus neutral” con-
trast within each type of perceptual decision task. Therefore, we pri-
marily included studies reporting either a main effect of emotion
(irrespective of the type of emotion, e.g., all emotions vs. neutral;
irrespective of modality, e.g., emotional faces and voices vs. neutral
faces and voices) or simple effects of emotion (e.g., discriminate happy
vs. discriminate neutral, when other emotions were also reported).
Studies were also included if they reported a main effect of task
(e.g., discriminate emotional faces vs. discriminate geometrical
shapes). We specifically excluded contrasts using resting-state or fixa-
tion cross as a baseline for comparison or contrasts comparing various
emotions against each other. Finally, we excluded imaging contrasts
correlating with other attributes (e.g., anxiety, personality traits).
Following the keyword search, 3,278 studies were highlighted.
The selection process of these articles took place in two stages. First,
the titles and abstracts were assessed, and the articles were retrieved
based on for relevance. Second, the full text of relevant articles was
assessed to determine whether the five inclusion and exclusion
criteria were met (i.e., participants selection, experimental stimuli, task
instructions, imaging data, and analysis contrasts). Following this pro-
cedure, 3,278 initial publications were found, of which 107 articles
(111 experiments) fulfilled all inclusion and exclusion criteria.
2.7 | Post hoc classification of paradigms
As with any meta-analysis, it is imperative that the individual tasks
within a target paradigm are as similar as possible, that is, that task
heterogeneity is reduced as much as it is theoretically possible. Fol-
lowing the identification of the 107 eligible articles but before we
conducted the meta-analyses, we performed a post hoc classification
of the perceptual decisional tasks on emotions to identify homoge-
nous paradigms. In grouping the eligible studies, we generally ignored
the authors' nomenclature as it tended to be heterogeneous and
inconsistent. For example, discriminating an emotional expression
F IGURE 2 PRISMA flow chart of the study search and study
selection process
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(i.e., comparing two stimuli against each other on a particular dimen-
sion) was sometimes referred to as “detection” (Buchanan et al.,
2000), “judgment” (Critchley et al., 2000), or “identification” (Gur
et al., 2007). Similarly, labeling emotional expressions was termed “dis-
crimination” (Johnston, Mayes, Hughes, & Young, 2013; Kotz et al.,
2003), “categorization” (Pichon, de Gelder, & Grèzes, 2009; van de
Riet, Grèzes, & de Gelder, 2009), “recognition” (Derntl et al., 2012),
“identification” (Kitada, Johnsrude, Kochiyama, & Lederman, 2010),
“classification” (Szameitat et al., 2010), or even “comprehension”
(Alba-Ferrara, Hausmann, Mitchell, & Weis, 2011). Given the high
variety with which the nomenclature was used, we opted to classify
the tasks based on the similarity in the instructions. We then gave
these formed classes of tasks new labels that would fit with the
corresponding paradigm.
A starting point in our post hoc classification was the seminal
study by Hariri et al. (2002) who found that a nonverbal emotion-
matching task greatly activates the bilateral amygdala. In this task, par-
ticipants must match the facial expression (usually angry or fearful) of
one of two faces to that of a simultaneously presented target expres-
sion. Since its implementation, this paradigm has been increasingly
used in research on facial expressions in both healthy and clinical
populations. Furthermore, Burklund, Craske, Taylor, and Lieberman
(2015) argued that emotion matching and emotion labeling tap into
distinct brain networks. Given the high possibility that amygdala acti-
vation could be driven mostly by the nonverbal matching task, which
might not be characteristic to other forms of perceptual decisional
tasks, we considered emotion matching and emotion labeling as distinct
classes of decision-making (Figure 3). We grouped studies on emotion
labeling to include those paradigms where participants are asked to
associate a perceived emotional expression with an appointed emo-
tion label. Specifically, emotion labeling included forced-choice studies
with response buttons dedicated to each emotional label or emotional
construct. Based on task instructions, emotion labeling could be fur-
ther divided into off-screen labeling and on-screen labeling, with the lat-
ter presenting the target emotional expression along with
simultaneous verbal descriptions of the possible choice labels (i.e., on-
screen), and the former requiring participants to perform without such
visual aids (i.e., off-screen). Such a distinction in task instructions
might prompt participants to use different cognitive strategies to per-
ceive the emotions (Figure 3).
Additionally, we grouped experiments into emotion discrimination
and emotion rating. Discrimination incorporates experiments in which
participants compare a target stimulus against background noise
(e.g., detect the presence or absence of a stimulus) or against other
similar stimuli (e.g., are these stimuli the same or different?) and it
draws inspiration from classical psychophysical studies (e.g., Phillips,
Channon, Tunstall, Hedenstrom, & Lyons, 2008; Soliunas &
Gurciniene, 2007; Van Hout, Hautus, & Lee, 2011; Figure 3). Emotion
rating consists of studies in which participants must gauge the inten-
sity or the valence of the emotional expression on a given scale and
draws inspiration from neuropsychological studies with brain-lesioned
patients (e.g., Adolphs et al., 2000; Fruhholz & Staib, 2017; Figure 2).
2.8 | Coordinate-based meta-analyses
Following the post hoc classification of studies into paradigms based
on task instructions, we proceeded with separate meta-analyses on
each paradigm of perceptual decisions on emotions. We opted for the
coordinate-based ALE meta-analysis, which identifies brain areas of
convergent neural activity across different experiments, empirically
determining whether this clustering is greater than expected by
chance. The ALE algorithm, as implemented in the latest version of
GingerALE 2.3.6 (brainmap.org/ale), captures the spatial uncertainty
associated with reported coordinates, treating them as the centers for
3D Gaussian probability distributions (Turkeltaub, Eden, Jones, &
Zeffiro, 2002) with widths based on empirical between-subject and
between-template comparisons (Eickhoff et al., 2009). One modeled
activation (MA) map is then created for each experiment by merging
the probability distributions of all activation foci (Turkeltaub et al.,
F IGURE 3 Results of the individual neuroimaging meta-analysis on the paradigm of labeling of emotional expressions when the available
choice labels are (a) displayed on the screen or (b) not displayed on the screen. (c) Results of the contrast analysis between the meta-analysis on
off-screen emotion labeling and (d) on-screen emotion labeling. Amy, amygdala; dTri, dorsal pars triangularis; Hipp, hippocampus; IFC, inferior
frontal cortex; mTri, middle pars triangularis; Orb, pars orbitalis; pMTG, posterior middle temporal gyrus; STS, superior temporal sulcus;
vTri, ventral pars triangularis
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2012). If more than one focus from a single experiment is jointly
influencing the MA map, then the maximum probability associated
with any focus reported by the given experiment is used. Voxel-wise
ALE scores (union across these MA maps) then quantify the conver-
gence across experiments at each location in the brain. As functional
activations occur predominantly in gray matter areas, ALE scores are
computed only for voxels with more than 10% probability of con-
taining gray matter (Evans, Collins, & Milner, 1992). The resulting
random-effects inference focuses on the above-chance convergence
across studies rather than the clustering within a particular study
(Eickhoff et al., 2009). To distinguish “true” from random convergence,
ALE scores are compared to an empirical null distribution reflecting a
random spatial association among all MA maps.
A major focus of the present study was to determine the differ-
ences and similarities in brain structures between the different types
of perceptual decisions on emotions. In this regard, we performed a
series of conjunction and contrast analyses between the different
types of decisions on emotions. We have to note that the number of
studies classified to certain paradigms (see above) differed across
these paradigms (Table 1). However, GingerALE accounts for an
unbalanced number of studies that are subjected to certain contrasts
by means of data simulation and permutation (Eickhoff et al., 2011).
Thus, the brain activations resulting from these comparisons between
paradigms are very unlikely influenced by the study number.
The conjunction analysis is computed using the conservative min-
imum statistic inference (Nichols, Brett, Andersson, Wager, & Poline,
2005), which calculates a simple overlap between regions that were
found statistically significant in the individual meta-analyses. This
implies that only those regions that are significant on a corrected level
in both individual meta-analyses are considered. Contrast analyses are
performed by computing the voxel-wise difference between two
ensuing ALE maps (Eickhoff et al., 2011). Specifically, all experiments
contributing to either the minuend or the subtrahend in these con-
trast analysis are then pooled and randomly divided into two groups
of the same size as the two original sets of experiments reflecting the
contrasted ALE analyses. ALE scores for these two randomly assem-
bled groups are calculated and the difference between these ALE
scores is recorded for each voxel in the brain. Repeating this process
several thousand times yields an expected distribution of ALE-score
differences under the assumption of exchangeability. The “true” dif-
ference in ALE scores is tested against this null-distribution yielding a
posterior probability that the true difference was not due to random
noise in an exchangeable set of labels. The resulting probability values
are then thresholded and inclusively masked them by the respective
main effects, that is, the significant effects of the ALE analysis for that
condition. A correction for multiple comparisons is not applied to the
contrasts analyses because GingerALE restricts the search space to
voxels that had survived the threshold in the main effect for the minu-
end (Eickhoff et al., 2011).
The GingerALE algorithm uses two sets of statistical corrections
(or thresholds). The first correction represents the p value that a voxel
must surpass to be considered (i.e., cluster-forming threshold) while
the second correction specifies the number of contiguous voxels that
must simultaneously surpass cluster-forming threshold to be
considered a significantly active cluster of voxels (i.e., cluster-level
family-wise error corrected thresholding). The reasoning for this dual-
threshold correction is that voxels representing false alarms due to
noise are more likely to be randomly distributed throughout the brain
and thus much less likely to occur in contiguous groups of voxels than
in single voxels (Eickhoff, Bzdok, Laird, Kurth, & Fox, 2012;
Lieberman & Cunningham, 2009). We thresholded individual meta-
analyses with a cluster-forming threshold at voxel level p < .001 and a
cluster-level family-wise error corrected thresholding of p < .01
(Eickhoff et al., 2012). To determine null-distributions, we conducted
10,000 repetitions. Contrasts analyses were based on the subtraction
of single dataset meta-analyses and the results were thresholded at
p < .05 (i.e., 5% probability that the differences observed between
datasets are due to random noise). To assess the null distribution, we
again opted for 10,000 repetitions. A correction for multiple compari-
sons is not applied to the contrasts analyses because GingerALE
restricts the search space to voxels that have survived the threshold
in the main effect for the minuend (Eickhoff et al., 2011). To ensure
enough statistical power, we limited our analyses to data sets which
contained at least 17 experiments (Eickhoff et al., 2016). All meta-
analyses results were localized and labeled using the Yale BioImage
Suite's digital medical atlas (bioimagesuiteweb.github.io/webapp;
Papademetris et al., 2006), and visualized using the MRIcron software
(nitrc.org/projects/mricron) with the MNI brain template.
3 | RESULTS
A summary of the post hoc classification of eligible studies can be seen
in Table 1. Most of the studies used various tasks of emotion labeling,
TABLE 1 Summary of the emotion perception paradigms included in the meta-analyses
Perceptual task Articles Experiments Participants Average no. of participants Foci
Emotion labeling 45 47 1,089 23 723
Off-screen 20 20 486 25 282
Onscreen 25 27 603 22 441
Emotion matching 34 35 853 24 528
Emotion discrimination 18 19 290 15 183
Emotion rating 10 10 218 22 173
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TABLE 2 Brain regions with significant convergence of activity pertaining to each paradigm of emotion perception
Paradigm Anatomical structure x y z
Emotion labeling (all)a,e Cluster 1 (k = 4,720)
L mid pars triangularis (IFC) −48 26 4
L dorsal pars triangularis (IFC) −46 34 4
L pars orbitalis (IFC) −40 22 −8
L pars orbitalis (IFC) −32 26 −4
L pars orbitalis (IFC) −46 36 −10
Cluster 2 (k = 2,632)
R superior temporal sulcus 52 −36 4
R superior temporal sulcus 58 −50 8
Cluster 3 (k = 2,280)
L amygdala −20 −4 −16
Cluster 4 (k = 920)
L posterior middle temporal gyrus −50 −58 12
L posterior middle temporal gyrus −56 −50 6
Cluster 5 (k = 608)
R pars triangularis (IFC) 54 30 −2
On-screen labelingb,e Cluster 1 (k = 992)
L amygdala −20 −2 −16
Cluster 2 (k = 760)
L pars orbitalis (IFC) −38 22 −8
L pars orbitalis (IFC) −34 28 −2
Cluster 3 (k = 712)
L mid pars triangularis (IFC) −46 32 8
Cluster 4 (k = 488)
R ventral pars triangularis (IFC) 56 28 0
Off-screen labelingc,e Cluster 1 (k = 4,320)
L mid pars triangularis (IFC) −48 26 4
L ventral pars triangularis (IFC) −50 16 −4
L mid pars triangularis (IFC) −46 38 0
Cluster 2 (k = 1,344)
L hippocampus −20 −12 −14
L amygdala −20 −8 −16
Cluster 3 (k = 1,016)
L posterior middle temporal gyrus −48 −56 14
Emotion matchinge Cluster 1 (k = 3,312)
R amygdala 22 −4 −18
Cluster 2 (k = 3,216)
L amygdala −22 −6 −18
Cluster 3 (k = 3,128)
R inferior frontal junction 46 16 22
R inferior frontal sulcus 52 26 22
Cluster 4 (k = 2,696)
R visual association area 26 −96 −2
Cluster 5 (k = 2,496)
L inferior frontal junction −44 18 26
Cluster 6 (k = 1,848)
R fusiform gyrus 40 −52 −24
(Continues)
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resulting in 47 experiments, 1,089 participants and 723 distinct activa-
tion coordinates in the brain (foci), followed by 35 experiments of emo-
tion matching, 19 experiments of emotion discrimination, and
10 experiments of emotion rating (Table 1).
3.1 | Individual meta-analyses of decisional tasks
Neuroimaging meta-analyses as those calculated by the GingerALE soft-
ware reveal the most consistently reported neural activity for a given
paradigm, for example, emotion labeling. In other words, they reveal the
brain structures most regularly engaged during a paradigm, above, and
beyond individual differences in experimental design, settings, or stimuli.
The paradigm of emotion labeling was characterized by extensive
activation in the left IFC (pars triangularis and pars orbitalis), as well as
the left amygdala, the right superior temporal sulcus, the left posterior
middle temporal gyrus (MTG) were recruited and the right pars
triangularis of the IFC (Table 2, Figure 3a). When the available choice
options were displayed on the screen, emotion labeling was associated
with a strongly lateralized recruitment of the left amygdala and several
patches along the left IFC, namely mid and dorsal pars triangularis, and
pars opercularis (Table 2, Figure 3b). When the available choice options
were not displayed on the screen for the duration of the trials, converg-
ing brain activity was found in the left mid and ventral pars triangularis,
the left posterior MTG, the left amygdala extending into the hippocam-
pus, and the right superior temporal sulcus (Table 2, Figure 3c).
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Paradigm Anatomical structure x y z
R fusiform gyrus 40 −64 −14
Cluster 7 (k = 1,360)
L visual association area −22 −96 −6
Cluster 8 (k = 1,256)
L fusiform gyrus −40 −54 −22
Cluster 9 (k = 1,152)
L + R dorsomedial frontal cortex −2 16 50
Cluster 10 (k = 864)
L thalamus −22 −30 −2
Cluster 11 (k = 696)
R intraparietal sulcus 34 −56 46
Cluster 12 (k = 656)
R superior temporal sulcus 58 −48 14
R superior temporal sulcus 52 −44 10
Cluster 13 (k = 536)
R thalamus 24 −30 0
Cluster 14 (k = 488)
L intraparietal sulcus −30 −56 44
Emotion discriminationd,e Cluster 1 (k = 1,264)
R pars opercularis (IFC) 42 16 20
R pars opercularis (IFC) 52 22 24
Cluster 2 (k = 864)
L amygdala −24 0 −18
L peri-amygdala −32 6 −22
Emotion ratingd,e Cluster 3 (k = 1,152)
L amygdala −26 2 −18
L hippocampus −32 −6 −20
Note: k = number of voxels in a cluster. L = left hemisphere. R = right hemisphere. IFC = inferior frontal cortex. x, y, z = coordinates of the peak brain
activations in the MNI stereotaxic coordinate system.
aAll tasks of labeling emotions from facial, vocal, and body expressions.
bLabeling emotions from facial, vocal, and body expressions when the choice options are displayed on screen.
cLabeling emotions from facial, vocal, and body expressions when the choice options are not displayed on screen.
dActivation revealed with a more lenient statistical threshold.
eBased on the contrast of emotional versus neutral expressions or a suitable control task at the study level.
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The paradigm of nonverbal matching of emotional facial expres-
sions is correlated with bilateral activations in the inferior frontal junc-
tion (IFJ), the amygdala, the visual association cortex, the fusiform
gyrus, the dmFC, the intraparietal sulcus, and the left thalamus
(Table 2, Figure 4a). At the chosen cluster-forming threshold of
p < .0001, no brain regions showed statistical convergence of neural
activity for the paradigms of emotion discrimination and emotion rat-
ing. Due to the overall lower number of experiments pertaining to
these two paradigms compared to emotion labeling and emotion
matching, we opted to lower the cluster-forming threshold to
p < .001, which revealed that the left amygdala was associated with
both emotion discrimination and emotion rating (Table 2, Figure 5a).
At this more lenient threshold, the right pars opercularis of the IFC
was additionally activated for emotion discrimination (Table 2,
Figure 5a).
3.2 | Contrast and conjunction analyses
Unlike individual neuroimaging meta-analyses, which find the most
regularly engaged brain structures during a given paradigm, contrast
analyses compare thus found brain regions of engaged neural activity
between two paradigms, that is, meta-analysis of paradigm A versus
meta-analysis of paradigm B. In other words, a contrast analysis
reveals which brain regions, if any, are more consistently more rec-
ruited by paradigm A compared to paradigm B. A conjunction analysis,
on the other hand, reveals which regions, if any, are regularly recruited
during paradigms A and B.
Comparing “off-screen” against “on-screen” emotion labeling rev-
ealed that the left ventral pars triangularis extending, the right supe-
rior temporal sulcus, and the left posterior MTG were more
consistently recruited during off-screen labeling, that is, when avail-
able choice options are not displayed on the screen during the percep-
tion decision-making process (Table 3, Figure 3d). Contrasting “on-
screen” emotion labeling with “off-screen” labeling did not reveal any
significant brain activation that is more consistently reported by the
former compared to the latter. Last, the conjunction analysis showed
that activations in the left amygdala and the left mid pars triangularis
of the IFC were common for both onscreen and off-screen labeling of
emotions (Table 3, Figure 3d).
The paradigm of emotion matching relies exclusively on facial
expressions. Therefore, to ensure a fair comparison, we looked at the
similarities and differences between this paradigm and a subset of
F IGURE 4 (a) Results of the individual
neuroimaging meta-analysis on emotion
matching. (b) Results of the contrast analysis
between the meta-analyses on emotion matching
and emotion labeling. Amy, amygdala;
dmFC, dorsomedial frontal cortex; FG, fusiform
gyrus; IFJ, inferior frontal junction; IFS, inferior
frontal sulcus; IPS, intraparietal sulcus;
pMTG, posterior middle temporal gyrus;
STS, superior temporal sulcus; Thal, thalamus;
Tri, pars triangularis; Vis, the visual cortex
F IGURE 5 (a) Results of the individual neuroimaging meta-
analysis on emotion discrimination and (b) emotion rating.
Amy, amygdala; Oper, pars opercularis of the inferior frontal cortex
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TABLE 3 Contrast and conjunction analyses of paradigms of perceptual decisions on emotions
Analysis Anatomical structure x y z
On-screen labelinga vs. off-screen labelingb No brain regions with significant
convergence of activity
— — —
Off-screen labelingb vs. on-screen labelinga Cluster 1 (k = 696)
L ventral pars triangularis (IFC) −48 30 −8
L ventral pars triangularis (IFC) −50 22 −4
Cluster 2 (k = 240)
L posterior middle temporal gyrus −48 −52 16
L posterior middle temporal gyrus −46 −54 10
Off-screen labelingb and on-screen labelinga Cluster 1 (k = 240)
L amygdala −20 −8 −16
Cluster 2 (k = 144)
L mid pars triangularis (IFC) −48 28 6
Label emotionsc vs. Match emotionsd Cluster 1 (k = 1,232)
L mid pars triangularis (IFC) −51 29 4
L mid pars triangularis (IFC) −48 32 2
L mid pars triangularis (IFC) −44 30 4
Cluster 2 (k = 312)
L posterior middle temporal gyrus −54 −58 12
Match emotionsd vs. Label emotionsc Cluster 1 (k = 2,488)
R visual association areas 30 −94 −6
R visual association areas 26 −94 −8
Cluster 2 (k = 2,424)
R inferior frontal sulcus 54 32 20
R inferior frontal junction 46 11 24
Cluster 3 (k = 2,256)
R amygdala 20 −9 −18
R amygdala 20 −4 −22
Cluster 4 (k = 1,744)
L inferior frontal sulcus −47 20 31
Cluster 5 (k = 1,048)
L visual association areas −22 −91 −9
Cluster 6 (k = 1,040)
L amygdala −28 0 −22
L amygdala −24 −6 −18
Cluster 7 (k = 936)
R fusiform gyrus 44 −56 −24
R fusiform gyrus 38 −54 −22
Cluster 8 (k = 800)
L fusiform gyrus −42 −60 −22
L fusiform gyrus −40 −52 −26
Cluster 9 (k = 792)
L thalamus −18 −28 −2
L thalamus −22 −32 0
Cluster 10 (k = 696)
R intraparietal sulcus 34 −58 42
R intraparietal sulcus 30 −56 42
(Continues)
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emotion labeling, that is, labeling facial expressions. Compared to the
nonverbal task of emotion matching, the verbal labeling of emotional
facial expressions distinctly recruits the left pars triangularis, the right
superior temporal sulcus, and the left posterior MTG (Table 3,
Figure 4b). Comparing emotion matching against emotion labeling rev-
ealed an extended network of bilateral brain regions comprising of the
bilateral visual association areas, amygdalae, the IFJ, the dorsal medial
frontal cortex, the fusiform gyri, the intraparietal sulci, and the thalami
that were uniquely recruited during emotion matching (Table 3,
Figure 4b). The conjunction analysis revealed that emotion matching
and emotion labeling of facial expressions similarly recruited the left
amygdala (Table 3, Figure 4b).
Due to the insufficient number of experiments for emotion dis-
crimination and emotion rating (Eickhoff et al., 2016), we were unable
to formally run contrast and conjunction analyses between these par-
adigms and emotion labeling and emotion matching.
4 | DISCUSSION
The present study tried to address the existing gaps in the literature of
emotion perception, namely the general lack of acknowledgment con-
cerning the heterogeneity of perceptual tasks (Elliott et al., 2011; Ong
et al., 2015) and how the brain idiosyncratically computes the various
perceptual decisions on emotions. We opted for an evidence-based
approach, based on the existing literature about the neurocognitive
mechanisms behind our perceptual decisions on others' emotions.
In this regard, we reviewed the neuroimaging literature of emo-
tion perception spanning 30 years. This resulted in three major obser-
vations. First, there are largely four research paradigms used to
investigate perceptional decision-making on emotions, referred to in
this article as emotion labeling, matching, discrimination, and rating.
Second, each paradigm of decision-making on emotions tapped into
different neural structures that reflect the putative cognitive demands
of the decision-making task at hand. Third, the left amygdala was
responsive across all classes of decisional paradigms, regardless of
task instructions, clarifying the degree of involvement of the amygdala
in the explicit evaluation of emotions. In the following paragraphs, we
will discuss these findings and we will conclude by proposing a
neurocognitive model of perceptual decision-making on emotions that
outlines the information flow in the brain needed for a proper under-
standing of other individuals' emotions.
4.1 | Emotion matching
Nonverbally matching emotional expressions, such as matching a tar-
get emotional expression to various other expressions perceived,
recruits brain regions of sensory processing regions and of higher cog-
nition. The presence of sensory regions is understandable given the
nature of the control task used at the level of individual experiments.
The control task invariably involves matching geometrical shapes
based on low-level perceptual cues. Contrastingly, the facial expres-
sions in the matching task contain almost exclusively emotional faces
(i.e., no neutral faces), most often fearful and angry. The comparison
between matching highly aroused emotional faces and matching geo-
metrical shapes would thus reveal residual activation in sensory brain
regions involved with processing the complex perceptual cues found
in emotional expressions. These sensory processing regions involved
bilateral visual association areas, fusiform gyrus, thalamus, and
intraparietal sulci, which have all been implicated in processing human
faces (Arcurio, Gold, & James, 2012; Frühholz, Fehr, & Herrmann,
2009; Haxby et al., 2000, 2002; Rossion & Retter, 2015; Yovel, 2016).
The emotion-matching paradigm also strongly recruited the bilat-
eral amygdala. Generally thought of as a module of automatic detec-
tion of emotions (Frühholz & Grandjean, 2013a; Öhman, 2002;
Pannese et al., 2015, 2016; Phelps & LeDoux, 2005; Vuilleumier,
Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001), the amygdala is preferentially rec-
ruited by angry and fearful faces (Adams, Gordon, Baird, Ambady, &
Kleck, 2003; Milesi et al., 2014; Phelps et al., 2001; Repeiski, Smith,
Sansom, & Repetski, 1996), which are the predominant stimuli in the
emotion-matching paradigm. However, an alternative role for involve-
ment of the amygdala is not as an automatic detector of emotions per
se, but rather as a detector of relevant and salient stimuli, of which
emotional expressions represent a subclass (Sander et al., 2003). For
example, the amygdala responds to novel neutral faces (Schwartz,
TABLE 3 (Continued)
Analysis Anatomical structure x y z
Cluster 11 (k = 536)
R thalamus 16 −32 −2
Cluster 12 (k = 208)
L intraparietal sulcus −32 −64 46
Label emotionscc and Match emotionsd Cluster 1 (k = 1,664)
L amygdala −22 −2 −16
Note: k = number of voxels in cluster. L = left hemisphere. R = right hemisphere. IFC = inferior frontal cortex. x, y, z = coordinates of the peak brain
activations in the MNI stereotaxic coordinate system.
aLabeling emotions from facial, vocal, and body expressions when the choice options are displayed on screen.
bLabeling emotions from facial, vocal, and body expressions when the choice options are not displayed on screen.
cAll tasks of labeling emotions from facial expressions alone.
dMatching emotions from facial expressions.
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Wright, Shin, Kagan, & Rauch, 2003) and neutral faces of a different
race (Hart et al., 2000) and abstract figures with learned associations
with food rewards (Gottfried, O'Doherty, & Dolan, 2003). Adding an
identity-matching paradigm involving neutral faces only, Wright and
Liu (2006) showed that bilateral amygdala activity was responsive dur-
ing both identity and emotion-matching tasks. Thus, it seems that the
matching task itself triggers amygdala activity. The authors argued
that the matching task adds relevance to the stimuli, including neutral
faces. Viewed alone, neutral faces would be expected to have less
inherent relevance than emotional faces but, during a matching task,
they must acquire task-related relevance. That is, out of the two pos-
sible faces to be matched, one becomes the “right” face while the
other becomes the “wrong” face.
In addition to sensory processing regions, we found additional acti-
vation in bilateral IFJ and the dmFC during the emotion-matching para-
digm. The IFJ is a structurally distinct region located at the junction of
the inferior frontal sulcus (IFS) and the inferior precentral sulcus
(Amunts et al., 2010). Lesion studies (Petrides, 1985, 2005), transcranial
magnetic stimulation (Verbruggen, Aron, Stevens, & Chambers, 2010),
and neuroimaging experiments (Clos, Amunts, Laird, Fox, & Eickhoff,
2013; Harding, Yücel, Harrison, Pantelis, & Breakspear, 2015; C. Kim,
Cilles, Johnson, & Gold, 2012; Sundermann & Pfleiderer, 2012) have
linked the IFJ to cognitive switching across a variety of domains such as
context switching (e.g., shifting between task rules or cognitive rules),
perceptual switching (e.g., switching attention between perceptual fea-
tures of a stimulus or between stimuli) and response switching
(e.g., switching between different stimulus-response mappings). The
dmFC is a complex structure that spans several distinct regions (Öngür,
Ferry, & Price, 2003) and plays different roles in social cognition
(Amodio & Frith, 2006; Dricu & Frühholz, 2016; J. P. Mitchell, Macrae, &
Banaji, 2005; Schurz et al., 2014). We found that the same portion of
the dmFC is consistently reported in nonverbal tasks of appraising the
mental states of both human and nonhuman agents based on observ-
able cues (Döhnel et al., 2012; Gallagher et al., 2000; J. W. Kim et al.,
2005; Schlaffke et al., 2015; Schurz et al., 2014; Völlm et al., 2006). In
the domain of emotions, the dmFC is highly active when judging the
appropriateness of specific facial emotions in a given context (J. W. Kim
et al., 2005) or inferring whether someone is genuinely sad/happy or is
simply posing for the camera (McLellan, Wilcke, Johnston, Watts, &
Miles, 2012). Furthermore, dmFC is also recruited when participants
must reason about the most likely scenario that caused an emotional
facial expression (Prochnow, Brunheim, Steinhauser, & Seitz, 2014).
It thus appears that the nonverbal task of emotion matching
invites participants to simultaneously infer the putative mental states
associated with the perceived emotional expression. Beyond percep-
tually attending to each facial expression (as indexed by the sensory
regions and intraparietal sulci), it is reasonable to expect that partici-
pants also mentally switch from appraising the mental state associated
with the target emotional expression to appraising the mental states
of each of the two potential choice options. Upon encountering emo-
tional expressions of others, we may automatically infer their traits
and mental states, and spontaneously integrate this information into
our impressions about others (Uleman et al., 1996; Van Overwalle,
2009, 2011). Strong functional (Harding et al., 2015; Sundermann &
Pfleiderer, 2012) and structural connectivity (Ford, McGregor, Case,
Crosson, & White, 2010; Sallet et al., 2013) between the dmFC and
the IFJ suggests that these higher cognitive brain structures work
together to coordinate decoding emotions and inferring mental states
in order to perform the matching task.
4.2 | Emotion labeling
We found a strongly left lateralized pattern of activation during all tasks
of emotion labeling (perceiving expressions from the face, voice, or
body posture and associating them with a label pertaining to an emo-
tion construct, such as joy or fear). This lateralization is very much in
line with relevant lesion (Bates et al., 2001; Riès, Dronkers, & Knight,
2016) and neuroimaging literature (Vigneau et al., 2006) on language
production and comprehension. However, we did not find converging
neural activation in sensory processing brain regions. Unlike the emo-
tion matching paradigm, the control task used in emotion labeling para-
digms often matches the emotional expressions in perceptual
complexity. In fact, 35 out of the 45 experiments used neutral faces,
voices, or body postures as a baseline. Therefore, activations in brain
regions associated with mental processes such as basic perception,
attention, and working memory would have been canceled out.
When comparing results for emotion labeling tasks that either dis-
played or hid possible response labels alongside the stimuli (“on-screen”
vs. “off-screen” labeling), we found some similarities and several distinc-
tions. Specifically, the left mid pars triangularis of the IFC and the amyg-
dala were similarly recruited during “on-screen” and “off-screen” emotion
labeling. Putatively, what “on-screen” and “off-screen” labeling share in
terms of cognitive processing is the successful retrieval of semantic
knowledge about the world around us, including emotional constructs
(Hamberger, Habeck, Pantazatos, Williams, & Hirsch, 2014; Miceli,
Amitrano, Capasso, & Caramazza, 1996; Raymer et al., 1997). Not sur-
prisingly, the left mid pars triangularis has been implicated in the domain-
general access and retrieval of information from semantic memory
(Costafreda et al., 2006; Gennari, MacDonald, Postle, & Seidenberg,
2007; Nee et al., 2013; Riès et al., 2016; Snyder, Banich, &
Munakata, 2011).
The right ventral and left mid pars triangularis of the IFC were
active during on-screen labeling of emotions (when the available
choice options are displayed on the computer screen for the duration
of the trial simultaneously with the target emotional expression). Both
of these regions are important in phonological coding (Adair,
Schwartz, Williamson, Raymer, & Heilman, 1999; C. J. Price, 2010), a
crucial cognitive process in single-word reading during which letter-
to-sound associations stored in long-term memory are accessed and
manipulated (Bokde, Tagamets, Friedman, & Horwitz, 2001; Palmer,
2000). Structural and functional differences in bilateral pars
triangularis can distinguish between normal readers and individuals
with dyslexia (Eckert et al., 2003; Leonard, Eckert, Given, Virginia, &
Eden, 2006; Norton et al., 2014; Partanen, Siege, & Giaschi, 2018;
Robichon, Levrier, Farnarier, & Habib, 2000). More importantly,
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training individuals with dyslexia on reading increases feedback con-
nectivity from the left pars triangularis to the right pars triangularis
and sensory cortices, which predicts the subsequent increased perfor-
mance in reading speed (Frye, Wu, Liederman, & McGraw Fisher,
2010; Z. V. Woodhead et al., 2013). Together, this evidence points to
the concerted effort of the left and right pars triangularis in the rapid
and automatic reading of printed words, such as the ones displayed
during the on-screen labeling of emotions.
On-line labeling of emotions also recruited the left pars orbitalis of
the IFC. This region is consistently involved in semantic judgments on a
wide range of stimuli, including single printed words (e.g., “is this word
concrete or abstract?”; Cutting et al., 2006; Devlin, Matthews, &
Rushworth, 2003; Fisher, Cortes, Griego, & Tagamets, 2012; Mainy
et al., 2008; Poldrack et al., 1999; Z. Woodhead et al., 2012; Yvert,
Perrone-Bertolotti, Baciu, & David, 2012) and pairs of printed words
(e.g., “are the two words semantically related?”; Booth et al., 2006;
Gough, Nobre, & Devlin, 2005; Kemmerer, Rudrauf, Manzel, & Tranel,
2012; Kotz, Cappa, von Cramon, & Friederici, 2002; Liu et al., 2013;
Mechelli, Josephs, Lambon Ralph, McClelland, & Price, 2007). More rel-
evant to the task of on-screen labeling, activity in the left pars orbitalis
increases when participants match pictures to auditory labels based on
semantic similarity (Schmithorst, Holland, & Plante, 2007). This finding
strongly suggests that, upon independently perceiving the emotional
expression of the stimulus and covertly reading the displayed emotion
labels (as indexed by the left and right pars triangularis), participants
perform the on-screen emotion labeling task by semantically matching
the emotional expression to the appropriate label.
Off-screen emotion labeling recruited the left mid and ventral
pars triangularis, left posterior MTG, and the right posterior superior
temporal sulcus (pSTS). The left mid pars triangularis was also present
in on-screen labeling of emotions and it likely reflects accessing
semantic knowledge (Costafreda et al., 2006; Gennari et al., 2007;
Nee et al., 2013; Riès et al., 2016; Snyder et al., 2011). The ventral
portion of the left pars triangularis has been implicated in verbal work-
ing memory (Rottschy et al., 2012), suggesting that off-line labeling of
emotions required maintaining the possible choice labels in working
memory for the duration of the trials. The activation in the left poste-
rior MTG coincides with a region long implicated in anomic aphasia
(Foundas, Daniels, & Vasterling, 1998; Goodglass, 1980; Kay & Ellis,
1987; Raymer et al., 1997), a brain disorder in which the patient
knows what an object is and how to use it, and can accurately select it
from a group of objects but cannot name the object (Goodglass,
1980). In other words, anomic patients have intact semantic knowl-
edge of the perceived object but no longer have access to the lexical-
phonological representation in the phonological output lexicon
(Butterworth, 1992; Levelt, 1992; Raymer et al., 1997). In an indepen-
dent line of research, neuroimaging studies have also consistently
implicated the same region in object naming (Cathy J Price, 2012;
Watson, Cardillo, Ianni, & Chatterjee, 2013). The critical role of the
left posterior MTG in naming objects might come from its strategic
location between the ventral processing stream—important for object
recognition—and the auditory and visual association cortex (C. J Price,
2012; Raymer et al., 1997).
The right pSTS has long been associated with recognizing and
understanding purposeful action and movements (Allison, Puce, &
McCarthy, 2000) and the basic understanding of intentions
(Pelphrey & Morris, 2006). Extensive research has shown that this
major sulcal landmark in the temporal lobe is sensitive to gaze orien-
tation (Hooker et al., 2003) and the movement of the human body
(Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000; Saxe, Xiao, Kovacs, Perrett, &
Kanwisher, 2004), hands (Gallagher & Frith, 2004; Holle, Obleser,
Rueschemeyer, & Gunter, 2010) and face (Fruhholz, Godde, Lewicki,
Herzmann, & Herrmann, 2011; Lee et al., 2010) through either direct
perception (Allison et al., 2000) or implied movement (David &
Senior, 2000). However, the pSTS is not sensitive to just any kind of
movement, as significantly more activation occurs when people
watch others perform complex versus simple actions (Castelli,
Happé, Frith, & Frith, 2000), physically possible movements com-
pared to impossible movements (Stevens, Fonlupt, Shiffrar, &
Decety, 2000), meaningful versus meaningless movements (Decety
et al., 1997; Schultz, Imamizu, Kawato, & Frith, 2004), and when
people observe transitions between meaningful actions within a
larger goal-directed activity such as cleaning the kitchen (Zacks
et al., 2001). Similarly, the pSTS sulcus is also involved when under-
standing and inferring actions from auditory cues alone, such as
footsteps and action verbs (Bidet-Caulet, Voisin, Bertrand, & Fon-
lupt, 2005; Hein & Knight, 2008). The overwhelming evidence sug-
gests that the right pSTS is involved in decoding and understanding
meaningful social actions conveyed by gaze direction, body move-
ment, and other types of goal-directed meaningful motion or implied
by spoken words (see also Frith & Frith, 1999).
4.3 | Emotion discrimination
When performing the meta-analysis with a more lenient threshold, we
observed activation in the left amygdala and the right pars opercularis
during emotion discrimination, in which participants must compare a
target stimulus against background noise (e.g., detect the presence or
absence of a stimulus) or against other similar stimuli (e.g., are these
stimuli identical or different?). The right pars opercularis has tradition-
ally been involved in Go-No Go tasks and Stop Signal Tasks, prompt-
ing its hypothesized recruitment in cognitive and behavioral control,
and inhibition of prepotent tendencies (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack,
2004; Derrfuss, Brass, Neumann, & von Cramon, 2005; Levy & Wag-
ner, 2011). However, a recent reinterpretation of the literature has
extended the involvement of the right pars opercularis to monitoring
salient features such as identifying a target item or a target dimension
in a series of nontargets or nondimensions (Hampshire, Duncan, &
Owen, 2007; Hampshire, Thompson, Duncan, & Owen, 2008, 2009;
Shallice, Stuss, Alexander, Picton, & Derkzen, 2008), and detecting
prelearned target objects (Hampshire et al., 2007, 2008; Linden et al.,
1999). Thus, it seems that, as with the other paradigms of emotion
perception, emotion discrimination is associated with brain regions
involved in general cognitive functions that are assumedly beyond
rather basic perceptual tasks.
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4.4 | The role of the amygdala in emotion
perception
The left amygdala was recruited across all tasks of explicit emotion
perception, regardless of task instructions. This is an interesting find-
ing since the degree of the amygdala's involvement in the explicit
evaluation of emotions has been a contentious issue in affective neu-
roscience. On one hand, research suggests that the amygdala is rec-
ruited in specific types of perception such as implicit (e.g., Brück et al.,
2011; LeDoux, 1998) or nonverbal (e.g., Hariri, Bookheimer, &
Mazziotta, 2000) emotion perception. On the other hand, several
lesion studies have pointed to a general role of the left amygdala in
response to emotional faces (Markowitsch, 1999), voices (Frühholz
et al., 2015), and pictures (Gläscher & Adolphs, 2003), a role that has
been backed up by neuroimaging studies of emotion perception (Baas,
Aleman, & Kahn, 2004; Sergerie, Chochol, & Armony, 2008) and emo-
tion experience (Costanzo et al., 2015).
The left amygdala might be involved in the cognitive appraisal of
emotional information, possibly via a global–local hemispheric bias
(Baas et al., 2004; Cahill, 2003; Markowitsch, 1999) while the right
amygdala might play an important role in the production of a general
arousal level. Specifically, the right amygdala is more strongly engaged
in fast global, albeit shallow, processing of emotional content (Henke,
Landis, & Markowitsch, 1993; Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1999), while
the left amygdala is more strongly engaged in active detailed
processing (Krickl, Poser, & Markowitsch, 1987; Morris, Öhman, &
Dolan, 1998). The preference for left but not right amygdala activa-
tion during emotion labeling could be argued that these tasks require
an important degree of local and detailed processing. For example,
participants might focus more on specific visuospatial details or
acoustic features that differentiate an angry expression from a neutral
expression to perform successfully. Conversely, emotion matching
might depend on both coarse and detailed processing of emotional
content, thus recruiting both the right and left amygdala. Systematic
comparison of tasks that require global versus local processing of
emotional material is needed via carefully designed experiments.
4.5 | A neurocognitive model of perceptual
decision-making on emotions
By synthesizing the findings of the meta-analyses (Figure 1b), we pro-
pose a multistage neurocognitive model that outlines the general flow
of information from sensory processing regions to frontal brain regions
(Figure 1c). We argue for three functional principles of perceptual deci-
sions on others' emotions. First, brain regions in the left and right hemi-
sphere are differentially recruited depending on whether the paradigm
is verbal or nonverbal in nature. The verbal task of emotion labeling
generously recruited multiple regions in the left hemisphere. These
regions have long been implicated in language processing, including ver-
bal working memory, access to semantic knowledge, reading, and nam-
ing (Goodglass, 1980; C. J. Price, 2010; Rottschy et al., 2012). The
nonverbal task of emotion matching consistently recruited bilateral
brain regions, resting on different cognitive mechanisms for optimal
decision-making. Instead of verbally processing the target emotion
along with the two choice options in a similar way to off-screen emo-
tion labeling, our findings suggest that we match emotional expressions
by primarily mentalizing about the perceived individuals' mental state
during their episode of emotional expression. Second, the resulting
information is made available to the IFC, where a functional anterior-
to-posterior gradient emerged in the left hemisphere. While emotional
information during the nonverbal paradigm of emotion matching con-
verges in the most posterior parts (IFJ and IFS), emotion labeling rec-
ruited the middle pars triangularis and the anterior pars orbitalis. Third,
the left amygdala was the only brain structure consistently recruited by
all perceptual decisions, regardless of task instructions. Unlike the right
amygdala, which is more strongly engaged in fast, global but shallow
processing of emotional content (Henke et al., 1993; Morris et al.,
1999), the left amygdala is more engaged in focal and detailed emo-
tional processing (Frühholz, Trost, & Grandjean, 2014; Krickl et al.,
1987; Morris et al., 1998; Pannese et al., 2015).
We must add a note concerning the possible limitations of our
neurocognitive model. The model mostly hypothesizes feed-forward
mechanisms of information from sensory regions to higher-level brain
regions. Perceptual decision-making, however, is unlikely a one-way
process, and also includes top-down mechanisms of prediction based
on context and prior expectations (e.g., Summerfield & De Lange,
2014). While we acknowledge the importance of these top-down pre-
dictive mechanisms, the empirical evidence for the functional processes
in emotion perception is surprisingly scarce. Some studies only recently
began to empirically investigate these mechanisms (e.g., Bernstein &
Yovel, 2015; Frühholz et al., 2016). Therefore, we refrain from explicitly
incorporating such mechanisms in our current model given the limited
empirical evidence on these functional and neural processes. Future
studies should extend our current model by including top-down pro-
cesses of emotional predictions and expectations.
5 | CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND
LIMITATIONS
When emotion perception consists of matching an expression against
other expressions based on perceptual features (i.e., a novel facial
expression against target facial expressions), we rely on a brain net-
work that largely involves inferring the mental state underlying those
expressions. Despite the artificial setting of such a paradigm,
mentalization is present in many forms of emotion perception ranging
from passive observation to explicit appraisal (Dricu & Frühholz,
2016; R. L. Mitchell & Phillips, 2015). On the other hand, when
prompted to perceive and name the emotion in others, we rely on lan-
guage processes to provide important support. One might argue that
verbal perceptual decision-making is synonymous with language pro-
cesses, for example, relying on phonological coding and reading pro-
cesses at large when the possible emotion labels are displayed on
screen; maintaining emotion labels in our verbal working memory
throughout the experiment when they are not displayed on screen;
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semantic matching between perceived expressions and emotion
labels.
The present findings are partially compatible with two psychologi-
cal theories of emotion. Strong appraisal theories suggest that we are
capable of ascertaining the emotion of others by first inferring the
appraisals associated with the perceived emotional expressions
(Scherer et al., 2013; Scherer & Ellgring, 2007). Specifically, following
sensory processing, we deduce the individual appraisals behind each
pattern of facial muscle movements, body postures, or vocal prosody,
and subsequently infer the emotion experienced by another individ-
ual. In this view, we should observe brain regions involved in
“mindreading” (i.e., the process of inferring others' thoughts, beliefs,
and desires) across all perceptual decisions on emotions (e.g., Frith &
Frith, 2006; Perner & Esken, 2015). We found support for the strong
version of appraisal theory in our nonverbal paradigm of emotion per-
ception, that is, emotion matching, but not during emotion labeling or
emotion discrimination. Conversely, constructivism theories—
particularly the strong versions—give language a crucial role in per-
ceiving (and, to some extent, inferring) one's own emotions and
others' emotions (Barrett & Kensinger, 2010; Barrett et al., 2007;
Lindquist & Gendron, 2013). In this view, brain regions pertaining to
language processing should be present in all perceptual decisions on
emotions. We found support for the constructivism theory of emotion
in both the online and off-line paradigms of emotion labeling, but not
for emotion matching or emotion discrimination. We should mention,
however, that off-line labeling of emotions may still trigger a basic
process of mental state inference, as suggested by the activation in
the posterior superior temporal sulcus (Gergely & Csibra, 2003;
Peelen, Atkinson, & Vuilleumier, 2010; Skerry & Saxe, 2014). Con-
structivism theories further claim that emotion perception is achieved
via domain-general cognitive processes that are not unique to emo-
tional stimuli. We found support for this hypothesis in all the para-
digms of emotion perception, including matching, labeling, and
discrimination. For example, emotion matching is achieved via
domain-general processes of cognitive switching in the IFJ and eye
gaze shifting in the intraparietal sulci (Clos et al., 2013; Corbetta,
Patel, & Shulman, 2008). Emotion labeling is likely achieved via lan-
guage processes that are not themselves unique to emotion, for
example, phonological coding, semantic retrieval of emotion concepts
(Rottschy et al., 2012; Schmithorst et al., 2007). Finally, emotion dis-
crimination activates the right pars opercularis in a similar way to how
discrimination between other classes of stimuli does (Hampshire et al.,
2007, 2008; Linden et al., 1999).
In conclusion, strong appraisal and constructivism theories of
emotion each partially predict the results in our meta-analyses. As
such, our findings align more readily with recent attempts at combin-
ing multiple elements from traditionally divergent accounts of emo-
tion perception (Moors, 2017; Nesse, 2014). Instead of singling out
some causal mechanisms of emotion perception at the expense of
others, it may be helpful to acknowledge that the route to emotion
inference is not singular and that there can be multiple mechanisms
that differ in functionality and optimality. Our results further reiterate
this by showing that emotion perception paradigms are, in fact, quite
heterogeneous. Depending on task instructions, perceiving agents
engage in different cognitive strategies that are called upon based on
the situation. Clearly, more scientific progress can be achieved if pre-
dictions of emotion perception are tested on a larger scale of para-
digms, beyond those included in this meta-analyses that can only
reflect the trends in the scientific community. On a more practical
level, we strongly recommend that emotion researchers acknowledge
the heterogeneity of emotion perception tasks, at the very least in its
two variants, that is, verbal and nonverbal perception. Neuropsycholo-
gists have long used sophisticated batteries of tests that tap into vari-
ous facets of emotion perception with the purpose of assessing subtle
neurological damage, under the assumption that different brain
regions underlie different perceptual tasks (Boller & Grafman, 2000;
Wilhelm et al., 2014). However, the fields of psychology and neurosci-
ence have yet to acknowledge the functional heterogeneity of emo-
tion perception tasks. Furthermore, when bridging results across
paradigms, authors should be aware that some emotion perception
tasks are not directly comparable. Instead, more circumscribed extrap-
olation and interpretation of results is warranted.
We must note of course the limitations of our study. As meta-
analyses are based on the available empirical data, their results may
be affected by scientific trends and a publication bias that disfavors
null results. We tried to mitigate the publication bias in the literature
by including neuroimaging results published in supplementary mate-
rials that were otherwise not reported in the main manuscripts. More
importantly, as detailed elsewhere (Eickhoff & Bzdok, 2013; Rottschy
et al., 2012), coordinate-based meta-analyses such as ours are less
susceptible to publication bias than standard meta-analytic
approaches that examine effect sizes because the assessment of spa-
tial convergence across experiments is not affected by additionally
including (observed but unpublished) null results. We are therefore
confident that the validity of our results was not substantially under-
mined by such bias.
Regarding scientific trends, our post hoc classification of emotion
perception tasks resulted in four major paradigms, that is, labeling,
matching, discrimination, and rating. However, many other types of
emotion perception tasks exist that have not been studied so far but
can be adapted to the fMRI environment (Boller & Grafman, 2000;
Wilhelm et al., 2014). We thus invite future neuroimaging studies to
test as many and as varied perception tasks as possible to reveal the
neurocognitive processes behind them. Following our post hoc classi-
fications of studies, labeling emotions was by far the most used emo-
tion perception paradigm, whereas emotion rating and discrimination
were the least used paradigms. Unfortunately, the number of experi-
ments for emotion rating (n = 10) and emotion discrimination (n = 19)
were below the minimum number generally recommended for neuro-
imaging meta-analyses (Eickhoff et al., 2016). As such, the rate of false
positives may be high, and results should be interpreted with caution.
Furthermore, we were unable to properly compare the different stim-
ulus modalities. The number of experiments per paradigm, emotion
construct (e.g., joy, anger, fear), and modality (i.e., faces, voices, body
postures) did not reach the minimum recommended number to draw
meaningful conclusions (Eickhoff et al., 2016). Instead, we looked at
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the commonalities and distinctions between paradigms of emotion
perception, while trying to mitigate the noise introduced by the differ-
ent perceptual modalities and the various emotion constructs by
applying a more stringent statistical analysis than typically employed
by neuroimaging meta-analyses, that is, a cluster-forming threshold at
voxel level of p < .0001 and a cluster-level threshold of p < .01
(Eickhoff et al., 2012). We therefore encourage future empirical stud-
ies to simultaneously compare several emotion perception tasks on a
wide range of stimuli (i.e., faces, voices, and body postures) in a full-
factorial design to reveal differences and commonalities between
tasks and classes of stimuli.
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